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INTRODUCTION
Early and ongoing judicial management is essential if the judicial process is to
survive. It is now obvious that adversarial lawyers are unable to achieve
proper management alone. This new procedure may necessitate changes in the
practice of many judges and attorneys, but unless we are willing to innovate
and break away from our present conduct, excess costs and delays will geomet-
rically multiply, and the result will be the denial of justice in our courts. 1
The "new" Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2 is now
six years old. The rule has brought with it a trend towards the more
1. Jaquette v. Black Hawk County, Iowa, 710 F.2d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 1983).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (amended in 1983).
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frequent hearing of Rule 11 claims by the courts as well as the more
frequent imposition of sanctions for its violation.3
The American legal system requires that all parties bear the bur-
den of their own attorney's fees and costs. While there are numer-
ous exceptions to this rule,4 none dampen the adversarial process
like Rule 11.
After the new rule was adopted, the Eighth Circuit initially hesi-
tated to impose sanctions pursuant to it.5 But the court system gave
strong warnings that failure to comply with Rule 11 would result in
the imposition of penalties.6 Apparently, these warnings were not
heeded by litigants or their counsel. In recent years, the number of
Rule 11 based disciplinary actions in the Eighth Circuit has
skyrocketed.
7
The "looming specter" 8 of Rule 11 is no longer a dormant threat
to advocates: it is now a reality every practicing attorney must face.
Today, the use of Rule 11 sanctions in the Eighth Circuit is preva-
lent, and punishment for its violation has never been more severe.
Recently, in Lupo v. Rowland, and Co. ,9 the Eighth Circuit affirmed a
decision imposing fees in the amount of $100,000, half of that figure
3. Since Rule 11 was amended in 1983, the number of cases in which the courts
of appeal have issued opinions concerning Rule 11 has increased dramatically. In
1983, these courts issued only one published opinion discussing the rule. In 1984,
the number of published opinions rose to ten. By 1987, the total number of pub-
lished opinions concerning Rule 11 issues was eighty-two. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical
Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 234 (1988). This survey covered only those cases which were
published in the Federal Reporter Second, Federal Supplement and Federal Rule
Decisions. Id.
In 1983, the courts of appeal affirmed the district courts' findings of no Rule 11
violations in the only published Rule 11 opinion issued that year. In 1984, in either
affirming the district courts' findings of Rule 11 violations or in reversing the district
courts' finding of no Rule 11 violations, the courts found violations in only two of the
ten cases in which the courts issued published opinions. In contrast, in 1987, the
courts of appeal found Rule 11 violations in thirty-four of the eighty-two cases in
which opinions were published. Id.
4. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2)(B) (1988 ed.); 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988); 42
U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1988). For a further discussion of statutory exceptions to the
rule, see Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 349-50 (1980).
5. See, e.g., Ueckert v. C.I.R., 721 F.2d 248, 250-51 (8th Cir. 1983).
6. Id.
7. More Rule 11 appellate decisions were published by the Eighth Circuit in
1987 than in 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986 combined. Vairo, supra, note 3.
8. In Baxley-Delamar Monuments, Inc. v. American Cemetery Assoc., 843 F.2d
1154 (8th Cir. 1988), the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of
plaintiff's state law claims and warned "it should not be necessary to remind counsel
that their claims shall doubtless meet more vigorous tests in the near future and the
spectre of Rule 11 sanctions looms for any allegations made without reason to be-
lieve they were well-grounded in fact." Id. at 1158.
9. 857 F.2d 482 (8th Cir. 1988).
[Vol. 15
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RULE 11
to be paid personally by the two attorneys sanctioned.1O
Lupo arose from the case of Bastien v. Rowland 11 in which plaintiffs
argued fraud on the basis of defendants sale to them of a high-risk
limited partnership. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the trial court's
decision that Rule 11 sanctions should be imposed on plaintiffs and
their counsel because the claim was meritless.12 The most chilling
aspect of Lupo is the Eighth Circuit's apparent endorsement of a
more liberal interpretation of the amended language in Rule 11.
This rule expressly concerns itself with the signing by an attorney of
a "pleading, motion or other paper."1 3 Despite this language, the
Eighth Circuit upheld the trial court's imposition of sanctions based
on the full record rather than on a specific paper. The court agreed
with the district court that the suit was "frivolous, and abusive, and
not directed toward the 'just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of the action.' "14 The Eighth Circuit refused to accept the defend-
ants' contention that the lower court's decision to base its findings
on the "bulk of the filings" and "conduct" rather than on a specific
document was fundamentally unfair. The defendants further argued
that failure to specify a document which violated Rule 11 resulted in
the absence of fair notice to prepare their defense in the evidentiary
hearing. In its response, the court simply stated, "Although we pre-
fer that courts identify specific pleadings or other documents impos-
ing Rule 11 sanctions, we find that the district court had adequate
support for proceeding as it did and that [the defendants] had fair
notice of the basis of the court's ruling."15
This liberal interpretation of Rule 11 is not an isolated case. Only
three months after the Lupo decision, the Eighth Circuit in Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission v. Milavetz and Associates 16 affirmed
Rule 11 sanctions on similar grounds. The Rule 11 Milavetz action
stemmed from a suit in which the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission alleged that Blue and White Service Corporation, a taxi
service, refused to hire an applicant because the individual had previ-
ously filed an employment discrimination charge.17 The Eighth Cir-
10. Id. at 486.
11. 631 F. Supp. 1554 (E.D. Mo. 1986), aft'd, Lupo v. R. Rowland & Co., 857
F.2d 482 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, Bastien v. R. Rowland & Co., 108 S. Ct. 160
(1988).
12. Id.
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983).
14. Lupo, 857 F.2d at 485 (quoting Bastien v. Rowland & Co., 116 F.R.D. 619, 621
(E.D. Mo. 1987) (Bastien II), one of two original actions from which Lupo arose).
15. Lupo, 857 F.2d at 485.
16. 863 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1988). See also "Appeals court rebukes law firm for
conduct in discrimination case," St. Paul Pioneer Press and Dispatch, Feb. 23, 1989,
at 14A.
17. Id.
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cuit upheld the district court's imposition of Rule 11 penalties based
upon "a pattern of uncooperativeness and delay [which] had begun
before litigation even commenced."18 The Eighth Circuit ordered
fees of $5,500.00 to be paid by Blue and White and Milavetz
jointly.19 These recent readings of Rule 11 must be seriously ana-
lyzed by the legal community in the Eighth Circuit. The new rule
itself broadened the scope within which sanctions may be imposed.
The Eighth Circuit's liberal rulings in Lupo and Milavetz broaden
the scope further and thereby increase the possibility that advocates,
already fearful of Rule 11 retribution under the amended rule, may
choose not to bring meritorious claims. These interpretations could
narrow the range of issues heard by the courts and ultimately affect
the course and development of the law in the Eighth Circuit.
This Note will focus on Eighth Circuit decisions since the rule was
amended, and will examine the following aspects of Rule 11: (1)
components of the new rule; (2) examples of Rule 11 violations; (3)
procedural requirements; (4) the prevention of sanctions under the
new rule; and (5) analysis of the effect of a liberalized interpretation.
I. COMPONENTS OF THE NEW RULE
Rule 11, as amended in 1983, provides that:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by
an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the
attorney's individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party
who is not represented by an attorney shall sign the party's plead-
ing, motion, or other paper and state the party's address.... The
signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the
signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other pa-
per; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact
and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is
not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay, or needless increase in the cost of
litigation .... 20
18. Id. at 614, (quoting EEOC v. Blue & White Serv. Corp., slip op. at 6 (D. Minn.
May 14, 1987) (unpublished memorandum and order)).
19. Id.
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. The previous rule read as follows (deletions in the 1983
amendment are italicized):
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at
least one attorney .... A party who is not represented by an attorney shall
sign his pleading .... The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate
by him that he has read the pleading, that to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed
for delay. If a pleading is signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule,
it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as though the pleading
[Vol. 15
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A. No Longer the "Pure Heart, Empty Head" Defense
Rule 11, as originally promulgated in 1938, required the element
of bad faith.21 The Supreme Court declared in its first interpretation
of the rule that attorney's fees may be assessed only "when the losing
party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive
reasons."22 Because, the predecessor to the amended rule required
a "willful violation" before sanctions could be imposed, this subjec-
tive standard made it necessary to determine counsel's state of mind,
and an attorney's assertion of good faith be disproved. 23 Because of
the difficulty in meeting this burden, Rule 11 violations were not easy
to prove. However, the amended rule has eased this burden by pro-
viding requirements more stringent than mere good faith, since the
reference in the former text to willfulness as a prerequisite to disci-
plinary action has been deleted.24
Shortly after the amended Rule 1 1 went into effect, the District
Court of Minnesota, in Van Berkel v. Fox Farm and Road Mach. ,25 re-
fused to accept as a Rule 11 defense the attorney's personal affidavit
that he acted in good faith. The court underscored the significance
of the amended rule when it stated that "[a]ttorneys are officers of
the court and [as such] their first duty is to the administration of
justice." 26 The counselor's claim that he had an ethical duty not to
move on the action before discussing it with his client failed to per-
suade the trial court. In its opinion, the court explained: "Whenever
an attorney's duties to his client conflict with those he owes to the
public as an officer of the court, he must give precedence to his duty
to the public. Any other view would run counter to a principled sys-
had not been served. For a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to
appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent
matter is inserted.
Id.
21. The original rule stated that disciplinary action could be taken only for "a
willful violation of this rule ... [or if) scandalous or indecent matter is inserted [into
the pleading] .. " FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1938).
22. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59
(1975). But several other statutes and rules providing for attorney's fees did not
require the bad faith element from their inception. For example, in a Title VII ac-
tion, the Supreme Court noted: "[T]he term 'vexatious' in no way implies that the
plaintiff's subjective bad faith is a necessary prerequisite to a fee award against him."
Obin v. Dist. No. 9 of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 651 F.2d
574, 577 (8th Cir. 1981) (citing Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412,
421 (1978)).
23. At least one circuit has suggested that the "pace of discovery" should be used
as a factor in determining the state of mind of the client and his counsel. Nemeroffv.
Abelson, 704 F.2d 652, 660 (2nd Cir. 1983).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 11; see also, Advisory Committee's Notes to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (1983).
25. 581 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1984).
26. Id. at 1251.
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tem ofjustice."27 Similarly, other courts have recognized the impor-
tance of the amended rule. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has
noted that without the good faith defense, the "new" rule would en-
compass a much wider range of circumstances.28
The new test is one of reasonableness, judged by an objective stan-
dard.29 Although several circuits persisted in employing the "pure
heart, empty head" standard following the 1983 amendment to Rule
11,30 by the end of 1986 all of the circuits, including the Eighth, had
adopted and applied the objective standard by decision.3l
The Eighth Circuit has upheld the use of an objective reasonable-
ness standard,3 2 not the subjective bad faith standard that was used
by courts prior to the 1983 amendment.33 Furthermore, the Eighth
Circuit has declared that, even in the case of the pro se litigant, parties
may no longer argue that their "good faith" excuses their actions.3 4
Unlike Rule 11, several state statutes regulating attorney conduct
27. Id.
28. Zaldivar v. Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Notes of
the Advisory Committee to Rule 11). "Rule 11, as amended, is intended to be ap-
plied by district courts vigorously to curb widely acknowledged abuse from the filing
of frivolous pleadings, and other papers." Id.
29. Id. at 830-31.
30. See, e.g., Nelson v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 750 F.2d 1234, 1238 (4th Cir.
1984); Suslick v. Rothschild Securities Corp., 741 F.2d 1000, 1001, 1007 (7th Cir.
1984).
31. Vairo, Rule 11: A CriticalAnalysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 207 (1988). See Eavenson,
Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 540 (3d Cir. 1985); Davis v.
Veslan Enter., 765 F.2d 494, 497 n.4 (5th Cir. 1985); Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor &
City Council of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177, 181 (7th Cir. 1985); Moore v. City of Des
Moines, 766 F.2d 343, 346 (8th Cir. 1985); Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d
823 (9th Cir. 1986); Hashemi v. Campaigner Publications, Inc., 784 F.2d 1581, 1583
(11 th Cir. 1986); Burkhart v. Kinsley Bank, 804 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1986); Confeder-
acion Laborista v. Cerveceria India, Inc., 778 F.2d 65, 66 (1st Cir. 1985); Chu v.
Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168,
1170 (D.C.Cir. 1985); Maier v. Orr, 758 F.2d 1578, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also
Aibright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217, 1221-22 (6th Cir. 1986); but see Nesmith v.
Martin Marietta Aerospace, 833 F.2d 1489, 1491 (11 th Cir. 1987) (stating that Rule
11 requires "bad faith," but acknowledging that the rule "incorporates objective
standard in assessing bad faith"). Id. at n.94.
32. See O'Connell v. Champion, 812 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1987) (objective
standard applies under Rule 11); Kurkowski v. Volcker, 819 F.2d 201, 204 (8th Cir.
1987). "They cannot now argue that their subjective 'good faith' (i.e. ignorance of
the law or legal procedures) somehow excuses their actions." Kurkowski, 819 F.2d at
204.
33. O'Connell v. Champion Int'l Corp., 812 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1987). The
court noted that, unlike Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1980) requires both unreasona-
ble and vexatious conduct. While the court would not deal with the question of what
standard may be appropriate in a § 1927 action, it indicated that it may require the
use of both an objective and subjective test. Id. at 395, n.2.
34. Kurkowski v. Volcker, 819 F.2d 201, 204 (8th Cir. 1987); accord O'Connell, 812
F.2d at 395.
[Vol. 15
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol15/iss3/5
RULE 11
within the Eighth Circuit still are limited to bad faith.35 Thus, ac-
tions against attorneys are frequently brought under both Rule 11
and state statutes. In Minnesota, for example, the statute regulating
attorney conduct requires that the assertion of a frivolous claim be
"knowing." 36 Therefore, unlike the federal rule, a claim brought
under the Minnesota statute must still meet the subjective test. The
significance is sharp: under a Rule 11 action, once counsel signs a
document her good or bad faith becomes irrelevant. The only re-
maining issue is whether the claim is frivolous, unfounded or
harassing.3 7
B. "Reasonable Inquiry"
In Rule I 1 claims, the reasonable inquiry requirement eliminates
the possibility that counsel may argue ignorance as a defense. The
Advisory Committee Notes state that in determining what is reason-
able a judge must be flexible: "[W]hat constitutes a reasonable in-
quiry may depend on such factors as how much time for investigation
was available to the signer; whether [she] had to rely on a client for
information as to the facts underlying the . . . paper; . . . whether
[she] depended on forwarding counsel or another member of the
bar."38
The standard focuses on the actual inquiry made, not the individ-
ual who made the inquiry, therefore, it does not appear to require
that the attorney perform the investigation herself. However, the
fact that attorneys other than the Rule 11 defendant counsel partici-
pated in the investigative process, offered advice on the pleadings, or
co-signed the complaint will not excuse the attorney if the objective
standard is not met.3 9 Even when a different law firm initially drafts
and pursues the action, the Rule 11 violator may not be insulated
from liability.40 As observed earlier, the question is not who makes
the inquiry, but whether the inquiry results in the accumulation of
enough knowledge to justify the signing of the certificate by the
attorney.4 '
The burden of making a "reasonable inquiry" is not difficult. In
all cases, basic discovery must be completed to disclose any fatal de-
35. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 549.21 subd. 2 (1988); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-824
(1985).
36. MINN. STAT. § 549.21 subd. 2 (1988).
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983 amendment) Notes on Advisory Committee on
Rules.
39. Brandt v. Schal Assoc., Inc., 121 F.R.D. 368, 378 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
40. Id.
41. See Schwarzer, Sanctions Under The New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104
F.R.D. 181, 187 (1985).
1989]
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fects in a claim, and the litigant must be able to articulate both fac-
tual and legal bases upon which a court could grant the requested
relief.42 In diversity issues, the plaintiff must make a reasonable in-
vestigation into the nature, quantity and quality of contacts between
the defendant and the forum state before filing a complaint.43 In
claims in which the statute of limitations may bar an action, sanctions
will not be imposed simply because the defense that the statutory
period has expired is strong. Provided a reasonable inquiry has dis-
covered grounds for tolling the statutory period (such as the rela-
tions-back doctrine), the plaintiff's claim will not violate Rule 11
guidelines.
II. EXAMPLES OF RULE 11 VIOLATIONS
Rule 11 states that sanctions will be imposed if the attorney's ac-
tions are meritless, frivolous, cause harassment, or avoidable delay,
or unnecessary increase in the cost of litigation.44 However, because
sanctions are imposed on a case-by-case basis, and vary with the facts
in each case, an analysis of specific instances in which the courts have
found Rule 11 violations may clarify this issue.
A. Duty of Candor in Citing Existing Law
Rule 1 1 mandates that all documents be "warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or re-
versal of existing law. .. ."45 This requirement was discussed by the
Seventh Circuit in Brandt v. Schal Associates, Inc. ,46 a case involving a
complex contract dispute between a construction management firm
and a contractor. In Brandt, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant-
management firm had violated the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organization Act (RICO). The defendants brought a Rule 11
action against the plaintiff's attorney asserting that, at the time the
complaints were filed, there was insufficient evidence to justify the
lawsuit, and alleging that the plaintiff's attorney violated the "war-
ranted in existing law" requirement of Rule 1 1 in each complaint.47
The court declared that the attorney in question "needed a fraudu-
lent scheme on which to hang the charged RICO predicate acts of
42. It is clear that basic discovery must still be completed to disclose any fatal
defects in a claim. In bringing all motions, plaintiff must be able to articulate both
factual and legal bases upon which a court could grant the requested relief. Id. at
186.
43. See Hasty v. Paccar, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1577, 1580 (E.D. Mo. 1984).
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
45. Id.
46. 121 F.R.D. 368 (N.D. IIl. 1988).
47. Id. at 369-70.
[Vol. 15
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mail and wire fraud,"48 and that the alleged false and fraudulent
backcharges did not satisfy the "pattern of racketeering activity" nec-
essary for a RICO violation.49
The court assessed monetary sanctions against the attorney, find-
ing that "his error was not in failing to uncover evidence contra-
dicting his claim, but rather in concocting a claim in the absence of
any evidence to support it."50
It would seem logical that a corollary to the Rule 1 1 requirement
that a claim be warranted by existing law is the duty of candor in
citing existing law. In Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs
Corp. ,51 the trial court held that misstatement of controlling law con-
stituted a Rule 1 1 violation.52 Golden Eagle involved an action, origi-
nally brought in a Minnesota state court and then removed to federal
court in Minnesota, for fraud, negligence and breach of contract
against the defendant because of an allegedly defective computer
system. 53 On defendant's motion the case was transferred to the
Northern District of California. The defendant then moved for sum-
mary judgment arguing that California, not Minnesota, law applied,
hence, that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limita-
tions.54 The trial judge noted the glaring differences between the
memorandum originally submitted to support the choice of law is-
sue, and the Rule 11 memorandum explaining the grounds upon
which the choice of law arguments were based.55 In the court's view,
the second memorandum conceded that the original argument was
not based on existing law.56 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
disagreed and reversed the lower court for several reasons.
First, this interpretation would "require district courts to judge the
ethical propriety of lawyer's conduct with respect to every piece of
paper filed in federal court." 57 Second, satellite litigation stemming
from the Rule 11 allegation results in excessive costs to all con-
cerned parties.58 In addition to the enormous expense,59 "what is at
48. Id. at 387.
49. Id. at 371, 387-88.
50. Id. at 389.
51. 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Ca. 1984), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
52. 103 F.R.D. at 128.
53. Id. at 125.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 126. The second memorandum was submitted at the direction of the
court. Counsel was asked to explain why Rule 11 sanctions should not be imposed
for submitting an unsubstantiated argument in the first memorandum. Id. at 125.
56. Id. at 127.
57. Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1539.
58. Id. at 1540. Examples of satellite litigation include later actions by the client
against her attorney's actions, and actions brought by one counselor against another
counselor who assisted in the original litigation.
59. See id. at 1541.
19891
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stake is often not merely the monetary sanction but the lawyer's rep-
utation."60 Because "[i]t is not always easy to decide whether an ar-
gument is based on established law or is an argument for the
extension of existing law; [and also because] [w]hether the case that
is being litigated is or is not materially the same as earlier precedent
is frequently the very issue which prompted the litigation in the first
place," 6 1 the court refused to extend Rule 11 to cases involving the
duty of citing existing law.
B. Inadequate Research and Investigation of Claims
Rule 11 sanctions may be imposed for the failure of an attorney to
reasonably research and investigate the facts of the case prior to fil-
ing an action as was the case in Viola Sportswear, Inc. v. Mimun. 62 In
Viola, defendants sold a pair of Sasson jeans to the plaintiffs. Be-
cause the plaintiffs had the sole and exclusive license to manufacture
and sell the jeans, they brought an action against defendants, alleg-
ing trademark infringement and unfair competition.63 While the ac-
tion on its face appeared reasonable, the single sale of the $10 pair
ofjeans was the only such sale ever made by defendants, and did not
appear to justify the charge by plaintiff's counsel that the defendants
were involved in a nationwide trademark conspiracy.64
During defendant's discovery, the president of the plaintiff corpo-
ration admitted at his deposition that he had never seen the com-
plaint nor any relevant documents or reports concerning the case
and, furthermore, that he had no evidence of a nationwide conspir-
acy. 6 5 In fact, he conceded that the jeans in question may have been
manufactured prior to the date on which the corporation received its
license.66 Based on these admissions, the defendants requested that
the plaintiff's counsel dismiss the action. He refused, and instead
proceeded with the litigation.
The court assessed Rule 11 sanctions against both the plaintiff and
its attorney, and chastised the counselor for not attempting to inves-
tigate the validity of the complaint through discovery.67 Failure by
the attorney to make a diligent effort to investigate, and failure by his
client to do the same resulted in the assessment of $20,000 in attor-
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 574 F. Supp. 619 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
63. Id. at 619-20.
64. Id. at 620.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 621. The court noted that Rule 11 stipulates that the signature of the
attorney in a pleading indicates that he believes the matter to be well grounded in
fact and that this belief is "'formed after reasonable inquiry." Id.
[Vol. 15
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ney's fees against them, jointly and severally.6 8
C. Ignoring Events Subsequent to Filing of Complaint That Undermine
Original Complaint
Andre v. Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust69 involved a second suit
brought against the defendants concerning a payment they received
for the management of a Ready Assets Fund. Their first suit had
been dismissed after a trial on the merits, and an appeal affirmed this
dismissal.70 The complaint in the second suit was also dismissed on
the merits after an evidentiary hearing.71 The plaintiff then filed a
verified amended complaint which reiterated a majority of claims
which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had already expressly dis-
missed.72 The trial court held that,
[w]hile there is no question that a plaintiff who has a colorable ba-
sis for a claim and who acts in good faith need not apprehend that
defeat on the merits of her lawsuit will require her to pay her ad-
versaries' legal fees, a plaintiff and her counsel who act in bad faith
and for their coercive and prejudicial effect to assert legal claims
without a colorable basis for the claim are liable for sanctions
under Rule 11.73
The court ruled that advancing claims previously found to be mer-
itless constituted a clear violation of Rule 11.74 For these reasons, a
penalty of $5,000 in attorney's fees was assessed against the attorney
68. Id. A similar conclusion was reached by the court concerning a Rule 11 viola-
tion resulting from failure to make a reasonable inquiry during discovery in Hasty v.
Paccar, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1577 (E.D. Mo. 1984). In this diversity action, plaintiff
sought to invoke federal jurisdiction and thus had the burden of establishing that
jurisdiction existed. The court held that, "in view of plaintiff's utter failure to come
forward with evidence of even the slightest connection" between the defendant and
the state in which jurisdiction was requested, the counsel for plaintiff had violated his
Rule 11 duty to make "a reasonable inquiry." Id. at 1580. This failure to find evi-
dence to support the exercise of in personam jurisdiction resulted in defendant's
being put to unnecessary expense in defending his position. While the court did not
impose sanctions, it suggested that the defendant "may wish to file a motion to im-
pose sanctions against plaintiff's counsel.., in the amount of [defendant's] costs and
attorney's fees in defending this action to date." Id.
69. 97 F.R.D. 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
70. Id. at 699.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 701.
73. Id. at 700. What may have angered the court most was the fact that, in her
Verified Amended and Supplemental Complaint, counsel used the future tense in stat-
ing that the court's decision concerning the original Andre II complaint "will not"
determine the issues raised in the amended complaint. The court found that failure
by plaintiff's counsel to use the present tense demonstrated "that plaintiff made no
good faith determination of the invalidity of her claims in light of the rulings by this
Court and the Second Circuit." Id. at 702.
74. Id.
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and client.75
Failure to base claims on existing law, inadequate discovery and
refiling claims which have been dismissed are common grounds for
imposing Rule 11 sanctions. However, this is not an exhaustive list
of when Rule 11 sanctions will be imposed. With the possibility of
"sanctionitis"76 reaching epidemic proportions in the years ahead,
the more frequent imposition of penalties is likely.
III. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
A. Initiating a Rule 11 Action
Rule 11 mandates that " [i]f a pleading, motion, or other paper is
signed in violation of this rule, the court upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction ... "77
In most instances, a party believing Rule 11 violations have oc-
curred will file a motion to request sanctions against the opposing
litigants. Failing this, however, it becomes the duty of the trial court
to impose sanctions. In Roadway Express Inc. v. Piper, 78 the Supreme
Court found that "[t]he power of a court over members of its bar is
at least as great as its authority over litigants."79 Thus, the Court has
recognized the inherent power of the trial courts to impose sanctions
including attorneys fees, dismissal, and contempt proceedings.8 0
1. Powers of the District Court
The Supreme Court has emphasized that one of the inherent pow-
ers of the district courts is the use of sanctioning devices " 'in pro-
tecting the due and orderly administration of justice and in
maintaining the authority and dignity of the court .... ' "81 However,
because such powers are "shielded from direct democratic controls,
they must be exercised with restraint and discretion."82
75. Id. at 703.
76. The Eighth Circuit, in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Fernandez, 830 F.2d
952 (8th Cir. 1987), stated: "We are also mindful that excessive 'sanctionitis' under
Rule 11 (as Judge Becker of the Third Circuit calls it) might discourage or 'chill'
vigorous and ingenious advocacy... " Id. at 956.
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (emphasis added).
78. 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
79. Id. at 766 (footnote omitted).
80. Id. at 764-65.
81. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) (quoting Cooke v.
United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925)). See also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
282-85.
82. Id. at 764. See also Grompers v. Buckstove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,
450-51 (1911); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193-94 (1958) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
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In recognizing the authority of the district court to impose sanc-
tions, the Eighth Circuit, in Kurkowski v. Volcker,83 upheld the trial
court's decision to assess penalties under Rule 11 even after the
plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the claim.84 The Eighth Circuit held
that the trial court possessed the power to issue a post-dismissal Rule
11 order for two reasons. First, matters outside the pleadings had
been submitted, so that the motion was one for summary judgement
(therefore the automatic dismissal provisions did not apply). Sec-
ond, the court's inherent authority to impose sanctions extended
83. 819 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1987).
84. Id. at 202. The fact that a plaintiff, faced with a request by the defense to
impose Rule 11 sanctions, elects to dismiss the action will not necessarily result in the
refusal by the court to impose judgment on the Rule 11 issue. The factual situation
in Kurkowski is similar to that in Andre H, as both involve the issue of claims being
raised after a court had previously dismissed identical claims involving the same ac-
tion.
Kurkowski involved plaintiff farmers in a class action against businesses in the
farm credit system. Several of the defendants requested that the district court im-
pose sanctions under Rule 11 because some of the same plaintiffs had previously filed
identical claims against some of the same defendants. Many of these claims had al-
ready been dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Plaintiff's counsel filed a notice of voluntary dismissal and the court dismissed the
case without prejudice. However, the defendants persisted in requesting that sanc-
tions be assessed against the plaintiffs, and the court then modified its order to hear
the sanctions issue. The district court granted the requested penalties, ordering the
plaintiffs to pay over $5000 in attorney's fees. Kurkowski, 819 F.2d at 202-03.
This decision by the Eighth Circuit seems to indicate an unwillingness to allow
parties bringing frivolous suits to be "let off the hook" by dismissing the case at the
point when Rule 1 sanctions appear imminent.
In an earlier decision, involving similar facts, the court allowed the plaintiff to
withdraw his claim--even when that party failed to properly file required documents
for withdrawal. In Foss v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of St. Paul, 808 F.2d 657
(8th Cir. 1986), plaintiffs commenced an action seeking a judgment invalidating a
debt to the defendants. Additionally, the plaintiff sought an injunction restraining
the defendants from proceeding on a foreclosure of plaintiffs' property as well as $23
million in compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants brought a motion for a
more definitive statement pursuant to Rule 12(e). Consequently, an evidentiary
hearing was ordered. Following the hearing, the magistrate concluded that the com-
plaint lacked merit and should be dismissed. The plaintiff petitioned the district
court for review and then tendered a voluntary dismissal. The district court refused
to allow the dismissal because the plaintiffs failed to file the proper dismissal docu-
ments with the court.
On appeal the Eighth Circuit reversed. The court refused to accept the defend-
ants' argument that, "by finding the complaint without merit and frivolous for pur-
poses of [Rule 11] and by considering matters outside of the pleadings, the district
court converted its own Rule 11 inquiry into the equivalent of a motion for summary
judgment." Id. at 659. Instead, the court reversed the district court's Rule 11 impo-
sition of attorney's fees and allowed the voluntary dismissal. The court held that
since at the time the plaintiffs filed their notice of voluntary dismissal with the district
court, the defendants had not served an answer or a summary judgement motion, the
district court erred in disallowing the dismissal. Id.
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even after dismissal of the claim.8 5
There are, however, limitations to a district court's authority
under Rule 11. For example, if a plaintiff files a notice of voluntary
dismissal and the defendant has not yet served an answer or a mo-
tion for summary judgement, the district court is without jurisdiction
and therefore, without Rule 1 1 authority.8 6 The Eighth Circuit has
also taken the position that additional sanctions cannot be imposed
under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,8 7 which
allows the court to grant relief from a final order or judgement for
mistake, newly-discovered evidence, fraud, voidness, satisfaction or
other reasons,8 8 because the rule cannot be used to impose addi-
tional affirmative relief.89
2. Due Process Requirements
Although the district court has the authority to impose Rule 1 1
sanctions, whether of its own accord or by request of opposing coun-
sel, it may not do so without providing appropriate due process
safeguards.
Procedural due process requires notice and a hearing before any
governmental deprivation of a property interest.9 0 The United
States Supreme Court has stated, "Like other sanctions, attorney's
fees certainly should not be assessed lightly or without fair notice
and an opportunity for a hearing on the record."91
Observing due process requirements will serve several important
functions: (1) the attorneys will have an adequate opportunity to pre-
pare their defense; (2) they will be afforded the chance to explain
the conduct in question in an oral presentation; (3) the presiding
judge will have sufficient time to analyze the severity of the sug-
gested sanction in view of the attorneys' explanation for their ac-
tions; and (4) the facts supporting the sanction will appear in the
record, which will serve to facilitate appellate review.92
While all courts agree that the accused has due process rights, the
nature and scope of these rights in a Rule 11 violation remains un-
clear. The Supreme Court's opinion, in Roadway Express,93 implies
that the due process concerns vary depending on the penalty which
85. Kurkowski, 819 F.2d at 203.
86. See, e.g., Foss, 808 F.2d at 657.
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
88. Id.
89. See Adduono v. World Hockey Ass'n, 824 F.2d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 1987).
90. See Miranda v. Southern Pacific Transport Co., 710 F.2d 516, 522 (9th Cir.
1983).
91. Roadway Express Inc. v. Piper, 477 U.S. 752, 767 (1980).
92. Miranda, 710 F.2d at 522-23.
93. 477 U.S. at 767.
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is imposed on the attorney. The Court in dicta noted, "The due pro-
cess concerns posed by an outright dismissal are plainly greater than
those presented by assessing counsel fees against lawyers."94
Unlike monetary sanctions imposed against counsel or punish-
ment of the attorney, dismissal of the action has harsh consequences
for the client as well as the attorney. The due process safeguards are
as vital in a dismissal order as in other sanction forms because such
an order punishes the client as well as the attorney, regardless of the
client's contribution to the wrongdoing which resulted in dismissal.
However, even in the case of dismissal, the Supreme Court in Link
v. Wabash Railroad Co. ,95 found that neither the failure to receive no-
tice of the possibility of dismissal nor the lack of an adversary hear-
ing violated due process or rendered the dismissal void. Addressing
the constitutional right to due process, the Court stated:
But this does not mean that every order entered without notice and
a preliminary adversary hearing offends due process. The ade-
quacy of notice and hearing respecting proceedings that may affect
a party's rights turns, to a considerable extent, on the knowledge
which the circumstances show such party may be taken to have of
the consequences of his own conduct.9 6
The Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of petitioner's per-
sonal injury action which was based in part on the lawyer's failure to
appear at a pretrial conference.97
94. Id. at n.14. In cases concerning due process guidelines in administrative
claims, the Supreme Court has ruled that, while due process is mandated even in the
deprivation of small amounts of property, the severity of the deprivation is a factor in
determining the appropriate form of the evidentiary hearing. Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 579 (1975).
The Court has provided four factors to be weighed in considering the amount of
process due in a given case: (1) the interest that will be affected by the official action;
(2) the risk of a wrongful deprivation of the interest through procedures used; (3)
probable value of additional procedural safeguards; and (4) the government's inter-
est (including financial and administrative burdens) that additional procedural re-
quirements would entail. Matthew v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
The four factors provided the basis for a separate opinion in Miranda, dissenting
on the due process issue. Miranda, 710 F.2d at 524-25.
95. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
96. Id. at 632.
97. Id. at 633. However, Justice Black (dissenting), expressed the opinion that
the court's ruling was fundamentally unfair:
[I]t seems to me to be contrary to the most fundamental ideas of fairness
and justice to impose the punishment for the lawyer's failure to prosecute
upon the plaintiff who, so far as this record shows, was simply trusting his
lawyer to take care of his case as clients generally do. The Court dismisses
this whole question of punishing the plaintiff Link for the alleged fault of his
lawyer with the single generalized statement: "Petitioner voluntarily chose
this attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the
consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent."
Id. at 643-44.
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It has been suggested that the Link Court took "the position that
no hearing is constitutionally compelled in certain circumstances
where established rules are transgressed. One immediate difficulty, of
course, is determining what are 'established rules.' "98 The ambigu-
ity surrounding the amount of due process required prior to an im-
position of Rule 11 sanctions has led at least one commentator to
recommend that standards and requirements for notice and hearing
be developed through local rules to prevent arbitrary imposition of
sanctions .99
While such local rules have not yet been implemented, the courts
appear to be recognizing the necessity for such "standards." The
Eleventh Circuit has declined to enunciate a specific rule, noting that
varying situations mandate flexible standards. Among the factors to
be considered are:
The interests of attorneys and parties in having a specified sanction
imposed only when justified; the risk of an erroneous imposition of
sanctions under the procedures used and the probable value of ad-
ditional notice and hearing; and the interests of the court in effi-
ciently monitoring the use of the judicial system and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that additional procedural requirements
would entail. 1oo
Although the Eighth Circuit has not yet adopted standards or local
rules, it has addressed the due process questions posed by Rule 11.
In Bastien 10, it held that, while a district court may impose sanctions
against attorneys, it may not do so without affording them proce-
dural due process at least as protective as that provided by Rule
46(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides:
A court of appeals, may, after reasonable notice and an opportunity
to show cause to the contrary, and, after hearing, if requested, take
any appropriate disciplinary action against any attorney who prac-
tices before it for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar or for
failure to comply with these rules or any rule of the court.1 0 2
98. Oliphant, Rule 11 Sanctions and Standards: Blunting the Judicial Sword, 12 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 731, 743 (1986) (emphasis in the original).
99. Id. at 740.
100. 118 F.R.D. 189, quoting Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1987).
101. 116 F.R.D. 619 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
102. FED. R. App. P. 46(c). See Bastien v. Rowland & Co., 116 F.R.D. 619, 620
(E.D. Mo. 1987) (predecessor case to the Lupo case discussed above). The Ninth
Circuit has upheld the right to an evidentiary hearing "absent extraordinary circum-
stances." One such circumstance which that court sees as compelling no review is
summary criminal contempt proceedings, where "instant action is necessary to pro-
tect the judicial institution itself." Miranda, 710 F.2d at 522. In non-summary con-
tempt cases, a "reasonable time to prepare a defense varies according to the
circumstances in each case." Id. at 524. In one instance, ten minutes was considered
reasonable. Id.
In Miranda, the court held that counsel's failure to comply with local rules re-
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The trial court in Lupo recognized that "Rule 1 1 does not address
the procedural rights of attorneys and clients who are threatened
with sanctions, and the development of the law is unclear," however
at least minimum due process safeguards must be ensured.103 In the
event an evidentiary hearing is allowed, a separate hearing is re-
quired to determine sanctions, even when the judgement on the
merits is also being questioned. This is because a motion for sanc-
tions is unlike a motion to alter or amend the judgement: "It does
not imply a change in the judgement, but merely seeks what is due
because of the judgement."1 04 Similarly, a district court's order and
a claim for Rule 11 violations are separately appealable.
Other courts concur with the Lupo decision, finding "[dlue process
requires, at a minimum, notice and an opportunity to be heard 'ap-
propriate to the nature of the case.' "105 This includes, in the case of
monetary sanctions, that "the attorney be given notice of the motion
for fees and have an opportunity to address the court before sanc-
tions are imposed."106 In addition, when the Rule 11 violation is
dependent upon facts genuinely in dispute, an evidentiary hearing
should be made essential.107
B. Appellate Review
The Eighth Circuit has consistently held that the determination to
impose a Rule 11 order is within the sound discretion of the district
court.' 0 8 It has stated, "Rule 11 makes sanctions mandatory when a
violation of the Rule occurs, but whether a violation has occurred is a
garding pretrial conferences resulted in due process requiring that the judge not
"give the lawyers any more notice or hearing than [the court] received." Id. at 525.
Relevant factors which the appellate court took into consideration in making this pro-
nouncement included: (1) the small fine in question ($250); (2) the fact that addi-
tional procedural protections would not have improved the accuracy of the judge's
decision; (3) the lawyers did not ask for additional time to prepare their defense; and
(4) the belief that, because the reason for the fine was the attorney's irresponsible
behavior, he should not be given further time to defend against the charges, thus
multiplying the burden on the court even further. Id.
103. See Bastien, 116 F.R.D. at 621, the predecessor to the Lupo case.
104. Obin v. Dist. No. 9, 651 F.2d 574, 581 (8th Cir. 1987).
105. Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of N.Y., 637 F. Supp. 558, 568 (E.D. N.Y.
1986).
106. Id. at 568.
107. Id. See also, Brandt v. Schal Assoc., Inc., 121 F.R.D. 368, 390 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
Another new aspect emerging in Rule 11 proceedings which further promotes the
requirement of an evidentiary hearing is the use of "experts" by each party to give
opinions on whether the attorney violated the rule. One court has ranked the impor-
tance of such experts as so great as to be essential in areas such as patent law or other
technically complex fields "in which the facts shown to have been known to the law-
yer when he or she filed suit would have to be explained to the court so it could
evaluate their objective sufficiency in Rule 11 terms." Id.
108. See, e.g., American Inmate Paralegal Ass'n v. Cline, 859 F.2d 59, 61 (8th Cir.
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matter for the court to determine, and this determination involves
matters of judgment and degree."109 While judgment against a
party for a Rule 11 violation is clearly appealable, the trial court's
decision will be given great deference,110 because the lower court
will have "intimate familiarity with the case, parties, and counsel, a
familiarity [the Appellate Court] cannot have. Such a determination
deserves substantial deference from a reviewing court.""'1 Failure
of the appellant to dispute the district court's award of attorney's
fees in his opening brief waives his right to appeal on that issue.112
In determining appellate reviews of orders imposing Rule 11 sanc-
tions, the Ninth Circuit, in Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles,' 1 3 established
a three-tiered standard based upon whether the dispute on appeal
concerns: (1) the facts relied upon by the district court; (2) the legal
conclusions of the district court; or (3) the appropriateness of the
sanction imposed." t4 The Eighth Circuit has adopted this three-
tiered approach.' 15 If the issue on appeal is the factual setting upon
which the lower court relied, a clearly erroneous standard is to be
used.' 6 Due to the broad discretion given the trial court, Rule 11
damages will rarely be found excessive under the clearly erroneous
standard. If the issue on appeal is the appropriateness of the lower
court's determination that the legal facts establish a Rule 11 viola-
tion, the standard of review is de novo. 17 Finally, if the appropriate-
ness of the sanction which the trial court imposed is disputed, the
standard of review is based upon an abuse of discretion test."18
The Eighth Circuit recently applied the "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard in reviewing Rule 11 sanctions in EEOC v. Milavetz."19 In the
original Milavetz action,' 20 the district court awarded attorney fees
1988); Bass v. Southwestern Bell Tel., Inc., 817 F.2d 44, 46-47 (8th Cir. 1987);
O'Connell v. Champion Int'l Corp., 812 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1987).
109. O'Connell v. Champion Int'l Corp., 812 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1987).
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. Ellingson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 653 F.2d 1327, 1331-32 (9th Cir.
1981). Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit has noted that, "a claim for attorney's fees
should be treated as a matter collateral to and independent of the merits of the litiga-
tion.... " Gates v. Central States Teamsters Pension Fund, 788 F.2d 1341, 1343 (8th
Cir. 1986). However, an order finding a party liable for attorney's fees and costs but
without yet specifying the amount of the award is not a final and appealable order.
Id.
113. 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986).
114. Id. at 828 ("[aippellate review of orders imposing sanctions under Rule 11
may require a number of separate inquiries"). Id.
115. Kurkowski v. Volcker, 819 F.2d 201, 203 n.8 (8th Cir. 1987).
116. Id.
117. See Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 828.
118. Id.
119. 863 F.2d 613, 614 (8th Cir. 1988).
120. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Blue and White Service
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against Milavetz and Associates, Blue and White's law firm, finding
"the conduct of defense counsel in the course of this litigation [had]
been unreasonable and outrageous." 21
The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's order assessing fees
of $5,500 to be paid jointly by Milavetz and Blue and White.122 In
upholding the order, the court recognized that factual findings form-
ing the basis of an alleged violation are reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard.123 The court determined that the district
court's factual findings were justified, and provided the lower court
with even greater leeway under this standard by stating that "a dis-
trict court need not make detailed factual findings and legal conclu-
sions on every item of evidence presented to it."124
The clearly erroneous standard affords the district court wide lati-
tude and, as the Eighth Circuit has stated, it will not interfere with a
lower court's order of damages in applying this test "unless it consti-
tutes a plain injustice, or a monstrous or shocking result."1 25
The de novo standard of review was applied by the Eighth Circuit in
Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc. 126 In Hartman, the plaintiff asserted
that the defendants, Hallmark and Mattel, used Hartman's copy-
righted graphics and scripts for their "Rainbow Brite" character and
products. 127 The district court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgement, ruling there were no substantial similarities be-
tween plaintiff's artwork and the defendants' finished product.128
The defendants appealed from the lower court's refusal to award at-
Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1579 (D. Minn. 1987). The EEOC brought an action against
Blue and White Service Corporation [hereinafter "Blue and White"] for its refusal to
hire an applicant in retaliation for the applicant's prior filing of an employment dis-
crimination charge. Blue and White was represented by the law firm of Milavetz and
Associates, P.A. of Saint Paul, Minnesota. Id.
121. Milavetz, 863 F.2d at 614.
122. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Blue and White Service Cor-
poration, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1648 (BNA), No. 4-86-345, at 9 (D.Minn. May 14,
1987) (unpublished memorandum and order granting partial summary judgment in
favor of plaintiff, available on Westlaw at 1987 WL 17034).
123. Milavetz, 863 F.2d at 614.
124. Id. The Eighth Circuit also applied the "clearly erroneous" standard in de-
termining whether damages were appropriate in a non-jury trial in Overton v. United
States, 619 F.2d 1299, 1304 (8th Cir. 1980). While not concerning a Rule 11 issue,
the court's comments concerning the clearly erroneous standard is equally pertinent:
"Although the amount of damages entered in a non-jury case is a finding of fact and
therefore subject to the 'clearly erroneous' standard of review ... any application of
that general standard must take account of the special circumstances in which that
kind of factual finding is rendered." Id. at 1304.
125. Jackson v. United States, 750 F.2d 55, 56 (8th Cir. 1984).
126. 833 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1987).
127. Id. at 119.
128. Id.
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torney's fees under Rule 1 1.129 The Eighth Circuit held that, since
Hartman's challenge concerned the lower court's legal conclusion
that Rule 11 was not violated, this conclusion must be reviewed de
novo. l30 Applying the "objective reasonableness" test, the appellate
court upheld the lower court's decision because "the plaintiff's case
was not baseless although weak .... [and] the district court's order
incorporate[d] the concept of objective reasonableness."l3'
The Eighth Circuit rarely overturns a sanction imposed when ap-
plying an abuse of discretion standard. In American Inmate Paralegal
Assoc. v. Cline,13 2 for example, the appellate court refused to overturn
the lower court's decision to dismiss the pro se plaintiffs' civil rights
action against prison officials. The court upheld the appropriateness
of the sanction, finding that "[t]he district court's exercise of this
power is within the 'permissible range of its discretion' if there has
been 'a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the
plaintiff.' -133
Again, in Kurkowski v. Volcker,134 the Eighth Circuit upheld the dis-
trict court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against pro se plaintiffs,
asserting that given the soundness of that court's factual findings and
legal conclusions, it did not abuse its discretion in awarding dam-
ages.13 5 Despite the leniency given to the form and content of pro se
129. Id.
130. Id. at 124.
131. Id.
132. 859 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1988).
133. Id. at 61 (quoting Haley v. Kansas City Star, 761 F.2d 489, 491 (8th Cir.
1985)).
134. 819 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1987).
135. Id. at 203-04. See O'Connell v. Champion Int'l Corp., 812 F.2d 393, 395 (8th
Cir. 1987) (substantial deference to be given to trial court's decision). The Minne-
sota judiciary did not reach its own decision concerning the correct standard of re-
view to be used under the new Rule 11 until recently. In Mears Park Holding Corp.
v. Morse/Diesel, 426 N.W.2d 214 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), the Minnesota Court of
Appeals made a landmark decision to abandon use of the three-tiered approach as
applied by the Eighth Circuit.
Mears concerned a developer who entered into a construction management con-
tract with the defendant. Id. at 215-16. The plaintiff brought an action in state court
against the defendant and two other contractors, alleging breach of contract, negli-
gence and breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 216. Soon after, the plaintiff brought a
similar action against the defendants in Ramsey County District Court. Id. The trial
court found the claims in the federal and state actions to be nearly identical and
concluded that, "the lawsuit started in this Court was designed to circumvent any
ruling of [the federal district judge] which might be adverse to the Mears Park inter-
ests." Id. In response to a motion by defendants, the court assessed $29,663.10 in
attorney's fees against the plaintiffs. See id. at 215.
On appeal, the Minnesota court found that, while under section 549.21 subd. 2
of the Minnesota Statute an abuse of discretion standard of review is clearly the ap-
propriate basis on which to assess damages, "[t]here is, however, no established stan-
dard of review for Rule 11 cases in Minnesota." Mears, 426 N.W.2d at 217. After
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complaints, the court refused to overturn the district court's decision
concerning the appropriateness of the sanction because of the broad
discretion given to the trial judge.
C. Pro Se Litigants and Client v. Counselor: Who Bears Responsibility?
Rule 11, under the newly amended changes, refers to persons or
parties other than attorneys.13 6 Courts have unanimously inter-
preted the new language of Rule 11 to apply to pro se litigants, al-
lowing pro se parties to be sanctioned under the rule. Eighth Circuit
courts have not hesitated to do so.' 3 7 In Kurkowski, the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals recognized "that pro se complaints are read lib-
erally, but they still may be frivolous if filed in the face of previous
dismissals involving the exact same parties under the same legal
theories." 138
In non-pro se actions, it is normally the attorney who is held re-
sponsible for Rule 11 violations, however, imposing joint and several
liability upon client and counselor is generally acceptable. For exam-
ple, joint responsibility has been placed on a plaintiff who permitted
reviewing the three-tiered approach, the court opted to follow an across the board
abuse of discretion standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Thomas v. Capital Sec.
Services, Inc., 836 F.2d 866 (1988). Using this approach, the appellate court upheld
the lower court's determination. Mears, 426 N.W.2d at 218, 220.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals chose to adopt this standard for four reasons.
First, a discretionary standard of review for Rule 11 corresponds with Minnesota's
abuse of discretion standard necessary for an award for attorney's fees per MINN.
STAT. § 549.21. Id. at 218. Second, the three-tiered standard, while reasonable, is
too complex. Id. Third, the trial judge is in the best position to determine whether
Rule I sanctions should be imposed. The court stated that:
The imposition or denial of sanctions of necessity involves a fact-intensive
inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the activity alleged to be in vio-
lation of Rule 11. The perspective of a district court is singular. The trial
judge is in the best position to review the factual circumstances and render
an informed judgement as he is intimately involved with the case, the liti-
gants and the attorneys on a daily basis.
Id. at 218 (quoting Thomas v. Capital Sec. Services, Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 873 (5th Cir.
1988)).
The purpose of differing standards is to provide varying bases upon which to
make Rule 11 determinations, but in the final analysis, the courts all seem to apply a
discretionary standard in reviewing trial court Rule 11 decisions. This may explain
why the Mears court chose to abandon the clearly erroneous and de novo standards.
Absent a clear finding that the lower court acted egregiously in abusing its discretion,
the Mears decision indicates that a Minnesota appellate court will not alter an order
concerning Rule 11 issues.
136. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. This rule refers to the signature of "an attorney or
party." In discussing sanctions it states the court shall impose them "upon the per-
son who signed [the paper, pleading or other motion], a represented party, or both."
Id. It also states that "[a] party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign [his]
pleading, motion, or other paper .. " Id.
137. See, e.g., Kurkowski, 819 F.2d 201, 203-04 (8th Cir. 1987).
138. Id. at 204.
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her counsel, in bad faith, to continue to assert legal claims without
merit in an amended complaint.t39 Rule 11 damages have also been
imposed against a plaintiff as well as his attorney who admitted that
he had no evidence (nor did his counsel) upon which to base the
action.140 Moreover, in Bastien, the case underlying the Lupo deci-
sion, the district court held both the attorneys and clients at fault,
and ordered sanctions in the amount of $100,000 to be paid by the
plaintiffs and their attorneys. 141 It noted that, "[t]he Court does not
hold plaintiffs blameless. This was their litigation, and their counsel
must be deemed to have acted at their direction."142
However, Rule 11 sanctions are not proper against a client in cases
where the party does not knowingly authorize or assist in the filing of
a paper in violation of Rule 11, or where the attorney fails to advise
the client of the wrongfulness of filing a paper signed or prepared by
the client which violates the rule. 143
In rare cases, sanctions will be imposed solely on the client.
Where the client misleads his counsel as to the facts or purpose of
the lawsuit, Rule 11 sanctions will be imposed on the client alone if
the attorney had objectively reasonable grounds upon which to sign
the papers at issue.144
Theoretically, the allocation of responsibility between client and
attorney is logical and just. In reality, however, the assessment of
fault between the two parties is difficult. Furthermore, it raises seri-
ous problems concerning the attorney-client privilege: "If attorney
and client disagree about who is at fault and point their fingers at
each other, the interests of the two are now clearly adverse."145 The
client will be forced to obtain a new attorney to represent his inter-
ests in the Rule 11 proceeding. The potential problems in the ensu-
ing hearing are obvious, as is the effect the ally-turned-enemy status
139. See Andre v. Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust, 97 F.R.D. 699, 702-03
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
140. See Viola Sportswear, Inc. v. Mimun, 574 F. Supp. 619, 620-21 (E.D.N.Y.
1983).
141. Bastien, 116 F.R.D. 619, 620-21 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
142. Id. at 621.
143. See Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1474-75 (2d
Cir. 1988).
144. Id. at 1475. At least one court has suggested, however, that Rule 11 techni-
cally should not apply at all in cases in which the client alone has acted wrongly.
"Rule 11 does not, by its terms, provide for sanctions against the filing of frivolous
papers. Rather, it provides for sanctions against an attorney's filing papers without
making an adequate inquiry." Eastway, 637 F. Supp. at 569. Due to the fundamental
unfairness in the result of this interpretation of the rule, the court decided the "bet-
ter conclusion is that sanctions may be imposed against the client.., despite the flaw
in the Rule's language." Id. at 570.
145. Id.
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of counsel will have on the attorney-client relationship. 146
Rule 11 is silent on the subject of whether its monetary sanctions
may be imposed only against the counselor-defendant or against her
law firm as well. The Fifth, and, more recently, Second Circuits have
discussed this issue on the appellate level. The Fifth Circuit found
that only the attorney signing the document at issue would be held
liable for Rule 11 violations, since holding otherwise would cause
"satellite litigation over exactly who [in a firm] was responsible for a
particular document.
' 147
The Second Circuit disagreed with the Fifth Circuit decision,
stressing that "law firms hold themselves out to clients, to courts and
to other counsel as more than mere aggregations of individual prac-
titioners sharing a phone."148 Based on the partnership-like rela-
tionship between the attorney and his law firm, the court held that
[t]he purposes of the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 will... be best
served by holding law firms responsible for the acts of their attor-
neys. . . . Firm responsibility for Rule 11 sanctions will create
strong incentives for internal monitoring, and greater monitoring
will result in improved pre-filing inquiries and fewer baseless
claims. 149
D. Nature of Sanctions Imposed
The original Rule 11 provided that an attorney acting in bad faith
could "be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action."150 While
this line was deleted in the 1983 amendment, the new rule still pro-
vides that the court "shall impose . . .an appropriate sanction, which
may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount
of the reasonable expenses incurred ... including a reasonable attor-
ney's fee."151
The wide latitude given the court under the new rule allows for the
imposition of virtually any penalty it finds appropriate: "The court's
options are no longer limited to the drastic-and therefore rarely
imposed-sanction of striking the offending pleading. Instead, the
146. See, Schwarzer, Sanctions Under The New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104
F.R.D. 181, 199 (1985).
147. Robinson v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1129 (5th Cir. 1987).
148. Calloway, 854 F.2d at 1479.
149. Id. at 1479-80. See, e.g., Anschutz Petroleum Mktg. Corp. v. E.W. Saybolt &
Co., 112 F.R.D. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (the court reduced the firm's fees as a deterrent
from transgressions of Rule I when it determined the time devoted to the litigation
was excessive); Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124
(N.D. Cal. 1984), revd on other grounds, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986) (sanctions or-
dered paid by firm when attorney's motion based on the statute of limitations was not
warranted by existing law).
150. See supra note 12 (pre-1983 amendment).
151. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (emphasis added)
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rule makes sanctions mandatory but leaves the specific sanction to
the discretion of the judge, allowing it to be tailored to fit the
situation."152
The judiciary has commented that Rule 11 has three major goals:
(1) compensation; (2) deterrence; and (3) punishment.t53 These
goals correspond with the three major forms of Rule 11 sanctions:
(1) monetary; (2) dismissal of the action; and (3) suspension or dis-
barment of the attorney.154
1. Monetary Sanctions
It has long been the rule in American courts that all parties to a
dispute are responsible for their own attorney fees, absent a specific
exception.155 One such exception is Rule 11. The most common
Rule 11 sanction is to assess attorney's fees and costs to the ag-
grieved party. Rule 11 requires only that the expenses and fees
awarded be incurred as a direct result of the violation, and that the
amount awarded be reasonable.156
One commentator suggests that, to determine the appropriate and
reasonable amount of monetary penalties, standards be promulgated
which require the moving attorney to submit detailed records offer-
ing evidence of hours expended, nature of the work completed, pre-
vailing community rates and affidavits confirming "fees similarly
qualified attorneys have received from paying clients in comparable
cases."1 57 While this suggested evidence is not yet required, the
trend in the court system appears to be moving towards this more
fair approach in determining monetary sanctions.
In Brandt v. Schal Associates, Inc.,t 58 the court requested that the re-
ceiving party submit a breakdown of expenses.159 The Eastway dis-
152. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 1 1-Some "Chilling" Problems in the
Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEo. L.J. 1313, 1321 (1986).
153. Mears, 426 N.W.2d at 219.
154. Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 764.
155. See Jaquette v. Black Hawk County, Iowa, 710 F.2d 455, 458 (8th Cir. 1983).
156. As the Supreme Court noted in Roadway Express, "[l]ike other sanctions, at-
torney's fees certainly should not be assessed lightly or without fair notice and an
opportunity for a hearing on the record. But in a proper case, such sanctions are
within a court's powers." Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 767.
157. Oliphant, Rule 11 Sanctions and Standards: Blunting the Judicial Sword, 12 WM.
MrrCHELL L. REV. 731, 747 (1986).
158. 121 F.R.D. 368 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
159. Id. In determining the amount of fees to be awarded, the District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois employed a "but for" standard. Thus the aggrieved
party could recover their expenses of "drafting and filing every paper in the District
Court and appearing at the various hearings held here" since "but for" the violator's
filing, the expenses wouldn't have been incurred. Id. at 389. All research expenses
were also recoverable, since "but for" the Rule 11 defendant's factually unsupported
complaint, the opposing party would not have been forced to claim in both federal
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trict court suggests that "the logical starting point for determination
of attorney's fees is a calculation of the number of hours reasonably
expended in responding to the frivolous paper, multiplied by a rea-
sonable hourly attorney's fee based on the prevailing market
rate."1 6
0
Monetary sanctions will rarely be reduced. The difficulty, as the
Eighth Circuit notes, is that "a judge is seldom able to make ade-
quate appraisal of what is necessary for counsel to do or not do in a
given case. This appraisal turns on so many subjective factors that it
seldom should be the basis for reduction of an attorney fee."161
The Eighth Circuit has appeared hesitant to assess fines greater
than attorney's fees. However, recent decisions indicate an increase
in the imposition of monetary sanctions. In Ueckert v. Commissioner, 162
while the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to assess attor-
ney's fees or damages against a plaintiff bringing a frivolous appeal,
the court gave fair notice to litigants that it would not be lenient in
the future.
Meritless appeals of this nature are becoming increasingly burden-
some on the federal court system. While sanctions will be denied
in the present case, we give notice that, in the future, this court will
consider assessing just damages as well as double costs for taking
frivolous appeals on issues already clearly resolved. 163
It did so one year later in Hughes v. Hoffman.164 While the court
refused to fully compensate the appellee for damages, it cited its
warning in Ueckert, and assessed attorney's fees and double costs
against the appellant and his attorney jointly and severally for their
attempt to re-litigate a matter which had been litigated and
closed. 165
While assessing attorney's fees and costs against a party clearly
meets the compensation goal of Rule 11 and serves as a fee-shifting
device, imposing additional fines or penalties serves to punish the
Rule 11 violator and to deter the type of activity which caused the
sanction.
The courts frequently find monetary sanctions most appropriate.
As the Ninth Circuit has emphasized, "imposing a monetary penalty
on counsel is an appropriate sanction considerably less severe than
holding counsel in contempt, referring the incident to the client or
and state courts. Id. The Rule 11 defendant created a sufficient "but for" nexus
which required repayment by the violator of costs "it should never have made in the
first place." Id.
160. Eastway, 637 F. Supp. 558, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (citations omitted).
161. Jaquette, 710 F.2d at 460.
162. 721 F.2d 248 (8th Cir. 1983).
163. Id. at 251.
164. 750 F.2d 53 (8th Cir. 1984).
165. Id. at 55.
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bar association, or dismissing the case."' 166
However, not all courts agree with the Ninth Circuit's statement
that monetary fines are less repugnant than other forms of sanction-
ing. In Anderson v. Lindgren,167 the Minnesota Court of Appeals ob-
served that an award of attorney's fees, even against a party acting in
bad faith, is a-distasteful judicial function that may not be "[the] most
appropriate method by which to deal with recalcitrant parties or
counsel. Courts have at their disposal less intrusive sanctions and
cautions which should be explored and exhausted before resorting
to an award of attorney's fees."168
A recent report by the Third Circuit Task Force on Rule 11 recom-
mends that "[d]eterrence of abuse by the person(s) sanctioned . . .
should be regarded as Rule I l's most important goal and compensa-
tion as only one (among many) means to that end, not an end in
itself."169
Because disciplinary action in the form of disbarment or suspen-
sion is impossible, the only options available in pro se cases are dis-
missal of the claim and/or the imposition of monetary sanctions. A
problem has arisen when the pro se party is destitute or imprisoned.
The Eighth Circuit addressed this issue in In Re Tyler.17o The plain-
tiff, a former inmate, filed numerous frivolous claims in his own
name and on behalf of other inmates at the state penitentiary. The
court found that the pro se plaintiff clearly deserved sanctions.171
However, "his lack of funds. . . preclude[d] the typical sanctions
available to the courts for imposition upon other abusive litigants,
such as those permitted by Rule 11. . . "172 Similarly, denial of his
right to proceed in forma pauperis would have completely denied his
access to the court. 173 The court determined that the only sanction
available would be to severely limit the number of cases he could file
with the court. 174
2. Dismissal of the Case
While the sanction of dismissal should be imposed only if the case
is meritless or frivolous, rather than to punish a negligent attorney,
166. Miranda, 710 F.2d at 520-21.
167. 360 N.W.2d 348 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
168. Id. at 353.
169. TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 (pending publication 1989).
170. 839 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1988).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1294.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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the Supreme Court has clearly vested that power in the district
courts. On this issue the Court has stated that:
The authority of a federal trial court to dismiss a plaintiff's action
with prejudice because of his failure to prosecute cannot seriously
be doubted. The power to invoke this sanction is necessary in or-
der to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and
to avoid congestion in the calendars of the District Courts. The
power is of ancient origin, having its roots in judgments of nonsuit
and non prosequitur entered at common law, and dismissals for
want of prosecution of bills in equity.' 7 5
The Eighth Circuit has recognized this authority, and has upheld
the dismissal of actions grounded on meritless claims.176 Dismissal
of claims under a Rule 11 violation serves to deter parties attempting
to bring frivolous or vexatious litigation into the court system.
Therefore, it may be justified in limited circumstances. However,
dismissal should not be used as a means of punishing or deterring
attorney misconduct alone. As Justice Black made clear in his dis-
senting opinion in Link v. Wabash Railroad Co.,177 dismissal may
inflict:
a serious injury upon an injured man and his family, who are inno-
cent of any wrongdoing. Plaintiff's cause of action ...was his
property. It has been destroyed. The district court, to punish a
lawyer, has confiscated another's property ... [a] district court
does not lack disciplinary authority over an attorney and there is no
justification, moral or legal, for its punishment of an innocent liti-
gant for the personal conduct of his counsel .... 178
However, in the case of the indigent Rule 11 violator, monetary
sanctions are unrealistic; in the case of the pro se party, suspension or
disbarment from the practice of law is obviously not an option.
Therefore, dismissal of the claim may be the only available alterna-
tive, as demonstrated in the Eighth Circuit's recent decision in Ameri-
can Inmate Paralegal Association v. Cline.179 The court stipulated that
"[p]ro se litigants are not excused from complying with court orders
and substantive or procedural law."180 Affirming the district court's
decision, it found that "[e]ven if there was any merit to appellants'
complaint against the prison officials, the voluminous amount of friv-
175. Roadway Express, Inc., 477 U.S. at 765.
176. See, e.g., American Inmate ParalegalAssoc., 859 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1988).
177. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
178. Id. at 637 (Black, J., dissenting). The Second Circuit has recognized the
harshness of the dismissal order. It therefore suggests "that the [district] court keep
in mind the possibility, in future cases of inexcusable neglect by counsel, of imposing
substantial costs and attorney's fees payable by offending counsel personally to the
opposing party, as an alternative to the drastic remedy of dismissal." Schwarz v.
U.S., 384 F.2d 833, 836 (2d Cir. 1967).
179. 859 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1988).
180. Id. at 61.
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olous documents submitted by appellants ... in connection with this
litigation supports the dismissal with prejudice as a Rule 11
sanction."181
3. Suspension or Disbarment of the Attorney
The most severe punishment for a Rule 11 violation, from the at-
torney's perspective, is disciplinary action against the lawyer. In Van
Berkel,18 2 counsel (who, it should be noted, had already been ordered
to personally pay defendant's costs, expenses and attorney's fees)
appeared before the Supreme Court of Minnesota for disciplinary
proceedings for his failure to voluntarily dismiss a claim which was
barred by the statute of limitations, after defense counsel's repeated
requests.8s The court upheld the referee's recommended public
reprimand and six-month suspension from practice. It found that,
"[a]n attorney who deliberately deceives the court is guilty not only
of obstructing the administration of justice but also of subverting
that loyalty to the truth without which he cannot be a lawyer in the
real sense of the word."184 While determining the most appropriate
sanction is difficult, the "[p]unishment should never exceed the
amount required to achieve the result desired. A deterrent is there-
fore appropriate when it is the minimum that will serve to adequately
deter the undesirable behavior."1 85
Each penalty has its proper place in the Rule 11 sanction system:
monetary sanctions are most commonly employed as they perform
the most equitable function by restoring the aggrieved party to pre-
litigation status. If monetary awards exceed attorney's fees, they
serve the additional purposes of deterrence and punishment. Dis-
missal can be used in cases of pro se or indigent violators, however, it
should be used sparingly. In extreme situations of attorney miscon-
duct, disbarment or suspension will serve to punish as well as deter.
Finally, the court is not limited to these forms of sanctioning. Other
penalties, such as reprimand or an order requiring the attorney to
attend court sessions or remedial courses may also be imposed at the
court's discretion.
181. Id. at 62.
182. 581 F. Supp. 1248, aff'd sub nom., Discipline of Schmidt, 402 N.W.2d 544 (Minn.
1987).
183. Matter of Discipline of Schmidt, 402 N.W.2d 544, 545-46 (Minn. 1987) (aris-
ing from Van Berkel v. Fox Farm and Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248 (1984)).
184. Id. at 548-49 (quoting, In Re Nilva, 266 Minn. 576, 583, 123 N.W.2d 803, 809
(1963)).
185. Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 565
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) (citations omitted).
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E. Judicial Supervision
While the trial courts are now imposing penalties more readily for
violations of counsel's responsibilities, the Eighth Circuit has taken
the view that ensuring that the lawyers' responsibilities are met is, at
least in part, a duty of the court itself.186 The Eighth Circuit recently
stated that "[i]n almost all cases the key to avoiding excessive costs
and delays is early and stringent judicial management of the case.
Sending counsel off into extended 'paper chases' in compliance with
pretrial orders has now been demonstrated not to be the answer." 187
Judicial supervision will serve to allocate the burden of avoiding friv-
olous claims between the court and the attorney, since "excessive
costs of litigation is as much the court's concern as it is of counsel
and litigants .... [I]t is time to recognize that the adjudication pro-
cess begins at the time of the filing of the complaint and carries
through to the last appeal."' 88
IV. PREVENTING SANCTIONS UNDER THE NEW RULE
In addition to the obvious precautionary steps which may be taken
to circumvent Rule 1 1 violations, such as avoiding frivolous or
harassing claims, there are several other factors which the courts
consider in Rule 11 deliberations. This Note suggests four areas
which may be important to the Eighth Circuit attorney.
First, because the court may no longer base its decision on a good
faith inquiry, it must now look for more subtle examples of frivolous-
ness, harassment, or coerciveness. To do so, the court will look first
to the only tangible evidence at its disposal: documents submitted by
counsel. Lupo and Milavetz notwithstanding, Rule 11 violations must
be based on a specific pleading, motion or other paper submitted to
the court. Therefore, the court will meticulously scrutinize briefs,
memoranda and other papers written or certified by counsel. The
courts have cited the following examples which may, collectively or
in part, indicate a lack of a valid claim on the part of the attorney or
party: (1) the fact that counsel's opening argument memorandum ex-
aggerates existing law and implies that the argument upon which the
claim is based is warranted by existing law when, in fact, it is not;' 89
(2) when a brief submitted on appeal from sanctions differs substan-
tially from the memorandum originally submitted concerning the
original claim;190 (3) failure in a brief to cite adverse authority;191
186. Jaquette v. Black Hawk County, 710 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1983).
187. Id. at 463.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 126-27.
190. Id. at 127.
191. Id.
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and (4) when an amended complaint simply embellishes, rather than
alters, an original complaint.192
Second, it is imperative that an attorney stay in regular contact
with his client. Obviously, maintaining written documentation of
this is advisable. In Matter of Discipline of Schmidt,193 the court repeat-
edly referred to the fact that not only did the attorney make misrep-
resentations, but he also "grossly neglected his client's matters, and,
not only neglected the matters, but failed to keep in communication
with his clients and answer their inquiries concerning their cases."1 94
Third, the Second Circuit, in Nemeroffv. Abelson,195 indicated that a
factor to consider in determining whether counsel has maintained an
action grounded on baseless allegations is the speed at which the
attorney investigates the matter. While the court in Nemeroff noted
that it did not "mean to imply that a litigant is entitled to attorney's
fees whenever an opponent fails to conduct discovery at full speed,"
it agreed with the trial court that "the pace of discovery" can be an
appropriate factor to consider in imposing sanctions.196
Finally, the behavior of counsel and his client during the course of
the proceedings will be considered. In Anderson v. Lindgren,197 the
Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision to as-
sess sanctions against both a client and her attorney. The attorney's
behavior, which included "making inappropriate facial expressions,
loudly demanding mistrial in front of the jury . . . and engaging in
generally disruptive activity" contributed to the court's belief that
the attorney had violated Rule 11.198
V. HAS THE NEW RULE GONE Too FAR?
The logic upon which the new Rule I I was built is sound. While
the rule serves to deter duplicitous litigation, to unclutter the court
dockets, and to prevent unnecessary costs from being imposed upon
innocent parties, its frequent enforcement and liberal interpretation
may pose considerable risks to the free spirit of the adversarial sys-
tem. One major problem is that because local rules or standards are
lacking, courts take conflicting approaches in determining Rule I I
violations. In analyzing a survey conducted in 1985 by the Federal
192. Andre v. Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust, 97 F.R.D. 699, 701 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
193. 402 N.W.2d 544, 549 (Minn. 1987).
194. Id. at 549.
195. 704 F.2d 652 (1987).
196. Id. at 666.
197. 360 N.W.2d 348 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
198. Id. at 352.
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Judicial Center, 19 9 one commentator found that "[t]he proper appli-
cation of Rule 11 is so unclear that about half the judges in the sur-
vey would have sanctioned as frivolous the same paper the other half
of the responding judges thought did not violate the rule."200 These
incongruous results may 'chill' litigation.
First, it may deter plaintiffs from suing to enforce their rights. To
avoid this, it is imperative that courts "resist the understandable
temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, be-
cause a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been
unreasonable or without foundation."201 The fact that bad faith is
no longer a prerequisite to a Rule 11 violation means that more dis-
cretion be exercised by the district courts to ensure fair and objective
analysis of a claim. The use of hindsight logic may exclude all but
the most meritorious claims.
Second, even if a cautious plaintiff decides to risk proceeding on a
dubious claim, the now prevalent imposition of Rule 11 sanctions
may thwart creative or ingenious methods of presenting claims. The
Eighth Circuit has already recognized this growing problem. It
states that the sanctioning of attorneys under the amended Rule 11,
"might discourage or 'chill' vigorous and ingenious advocacy, espe-
cially in matters of controversial character where there is a reason-
able likelihood of achieving potential change in the law." 20 2 Bright
line rules in the legal arena are rare indeed, and no prospective
plaintiff can be assured of success. Claims which have been brought
successfully in recent years, including palimony, 203 the duty to warn
of infectious diseases,204 and the right to protect one's voice or like-
ness2 05 may have been considered "frivolous" or "meritless" had
Rule 11 been employed as widely in the past as it is today.
Finally, there may be no more eager or idealistic attorney than the
neophyte who enters the legal profession anxious to break new
ground in the legal system. This fresh and unique perspective
should not be bridled by the fear of retribution for suggesting or
pursuing new causes of action. The courts have recognized this issue
and are now often taking the experience of the attorney into consid-
199. Kassin, An Empirical Study of Rule 11 Sanctions 38 (Federal Judicial Center
1985).
200. Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 Harv. L.
R. 630, 641 (1987).
201. Christianburg Garmet Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1978), quoted in
Bass v. Southwestern Bell Telephone, Inc., 817 F.2d 44, 47 (8th Cir, 1987).
202. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Fernandez, 830 F.2d 952, 956 (8th Cir. 1987).
203. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.3d 660, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106
(1976).
204. See, e.g., R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
205. See, e.g., Motown Record Corp. v. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236 (C.D.
Cal. 1987).
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eration prior to imposing Rule 11 sanctions. 206
Because the new Rule 11 extends to pro se litigants, the possibility
that the indigent petitioner will not be able to have his day in court is
much greater. A cornerstone of the American judicial system is that
the poor are no less entitled to free access of the courts than are the
wealthy. However, under the new Rule 11, this may no longer be as
true. The pro se litigant who prepares his own case may be disadvan-
taged by the new rule. Only parties who can afford law firms, em-
ploying attorneys familiar with the types of actions which risk Rule
11 violations will be assured that they themselves will not risk fines
or dismissal of their case. The pro se party will be intimidated by the
possibility that her claim will be found to violate Rule 11. Further-
more, since evidentiary hearings are not yet mandatory, the pro se
plaintiff may not be given the opportunity to explain the reasons be-
hind his cause of action.
Finally, the liberal interpretation of Rule 1 1 by the Eighth Circuit
raises serious questions concerning the adversarial system. In Bas-
tien,207 the original case from which Lupo arose, plaintiffs purchased
limited partnership interests in five limited partnerships organized to
distribute motion pictures (a notoriously high-risk investment) at a
time when they were a recognized tax shelter.208
The partnerships proved unprofitable and only a year after the in-
vestments were made, Congress eradicated the tax shelter. The
plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the defendants had defrauded them
of their investment capital by organizing the limited partnerships so
that the general partners would receive a profit but the limited part-
ners would not.20 9 The defendants eventually moved for summary
judgement, which, after several repeated motions to dismiss, was
granted. 210 On the defendants' request for attorney's fees and ex-
penses, the district court awarded defendants $100,000 due to plain-
tiffs' and their counsel's bad faith conduct.211 In doing so, the court
noted that nearly four years after the claim was brought, the plaintiffs
still "stood wholly without proof of their claims."212
The court employed the "objective reasonableness" standard re-
quired by the new rule: that "sanctions shall be imposed [if], after
reasonable inquiry, a competent attorney could not form a reason-
206. See, e.g., Huettig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council of
Northern California, 790 F.2d 1421, 1427 (9th Cir. 1986); Johnson v. Kut Kwick
Corp., 620 F. Supp. 748 (S.D. Ga. 1984).
207. 631 F. Supp. 1554 (E.D.Mo. 1986), aff'd, Lupo v. R. Rowland & Co., 857 F.2d
482 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, Bastien v. R. Rowland & Co., 108 S.Ct. 160 (1988).
208. Bastien, 631 F. Supp. at 1556.
209. Id. at 1557.
210. Id. at 1559.
211. Bastien, 116 F.R.D. at 620-21.
212. Id. at 621.
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able belief that the pleading is well grounded in fact and is warranted
by existing law. .. *"213 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit upheld the
trial court's decision.214 Despite the attorneys' objections based on
the fact that the district court did not make its findings on a specific
pleading, motion or other paper, but rather on the "bulk of the fil-
ings," the court refused to reverse the decision.215 Lupo may change
the course of Rule 11 findings in the Eighth Circuit, as it has given
district courts in this circuit the power to impose Rule 1 1 sanctions
based on their impressions of the entire conduct of the attorneys
during the proceedings, rather than on any tangible documentary
material.
Shortly after the Lupo decision, the court made a similar ruling in
Milavetz. The district court, in EEOC v. Blue and White Service Corp. ,216
noted that counsel for defense repeatedly failed to respond to dis-
covery requests by EEOC, that neither the defendant nor defense
counsel cooperated with EEOC's efforts at conciliation, and that they
displayed a pattern of uncooperativeness and delay throughout the
proceeding.217 Rather than base its finding on a specific document,
the district court instead imposed attorney's fees against the defense
counsel based on the "totality of the circumstances" concerning
counsel's conduct. 218 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
decision using an "abuse of discretion" standard. 219
The Eighth Circuit appears to be following the "continuing duty"
approach which was adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Basch v. West-
inghouse Electric Corp.220 In Basch, the court affirmed an award of at-
torney's fees based not on a specific pleading or paper, but rather on
the attorney's indecision as to whether he would call an expert wit-
ness named in an interrogatory response.
The Second Circuit has recognized the dangers of imposing such a
duty:
Limiting the application of rule 11 to testing the attorney's conduct
at the time a paper is signed is virtually mandated by the plain lan-
guage of the rule....
While the drafters of the rule could easily have further extended
its application by referring to the entire conduct of the proceed-
213. Id. (citing Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254
(2d Cir. 1985)).
214. Lupo, 857 F.2d at 484.
215. Id. at 485.
216. EEOC v. Blue and White Service Corp., (unpublished memorandum and or-
der) [available on Westlaw, 1987 WL 17034].
217. Id. at slip op. 9.
218. Id. at slip op. 10.
219. EEOC v. Milavetz and Associates, 863 F.2d 613, 614 (8th Cir. 1988) (citation
omitted).
220. 777 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1985).
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ings, they failed to do so and instead chose to expand only the cate-
gories of papers to which the rule applies. 22 1
The Eighth Circuit's recent rulings mean that lawyers must remain
alert to the possible ramifications of all of their actions during trial.
However, the judiciary's continued willingness to take responsibility
in curbing abuse of the system before sanctions become necessary
may ease counsel's burden.
In addition, the increasing use of strict guidelines in imposing
sanctions under the new Rule 11 will help prevent its overuse. While
the local rules that have been suggested are not yet in effect, many of
these concerns have been met as the courts continue to create stan-
dards upon which to base Rule 11 sanctions. Requiring an eviden-
tiary hearing prior to the imposition of penalties in Rule 11 cases is
one procedural safeguard which, while not yet mandatory, is widely
recognized. By providing the Rule 1 1 defendant with the opportu-
nity to submit a brief outlining the party's reasons for its actions, the
court will not be tempted to use post hoc reasoning and logic.
Using guidelines to judge the severity of a Rule 1 1 violation will
also give the court a set of criteria upon which to determine the ap-
propriate sanction, if any, to impose. One court suggests that,
before an attorney or client is severely sanctioned, an evidentiary
hearing must be provided to afford an opportunity to consider fac-
tors which would "justify the court's mitigating the severity of the
sanctions imposed."222 These factors include: (1) whether the party
acted in good faith; (2) whether the party acted to punish opposing
party or acted vindictively; (3) whether the attorney was a neophyte,
or an experienced attorney with a "clean" record; (4) the party's fi-
nancial resources relating to his ability to pay; (5) the need for com-
pensation of the opposing party; (6) the degree of frivolousness; and
(7) the consideration of the dangers inherent in Rule 11 sanctions
concerning the chilling of the adversarial process. 223 The report of
the Third Circuit Task Force on Rule 11 suggests that, while eviden-
tiary hearings normally are not necessary, Rule 11 sanctions be im-
posed upon a party "[o]nly after that individual has had suitably
specific notice and an adequate opportunity to be heard." 22 4
CONCLUSION
The importance of not allowing "sanctionitis" to become an un-
221. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. deniedsub nom.,
480 U.S. 918 (1987).
222. Eastway Const. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 569 (E.D.N.Y.
1986).
223. Id. at 571.
224. RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 (pending publication 1989)
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controllable epidemic with adverse consequences to the American
legal system is now recognized by the courts. By using judicial moni-
toring, strict guidelines outlining the appropriateness of sanctions,
and the mandating of due process safeguards, Rule 11 can continue
to serve its legitimate and necessary function. The creation of a Rule
11 Task Force in the Eighth Circuit could help to identify problem
areas and recommend these guidelines, as did the Third Circuit's
task force.
However, it must be remembered, as noted by Justice Brandeis,
that "lawsuits . . .often prove to have been groundless; but no way
has been discovered of relieving a defendant from the necessity of a
trial to establish the fact."225 Furthermore, it is vital that the pro se
litigant not be deterred from bringing or defending a valid claim.
Nor can the legal system afford to lose the creative attorney willing
to forge a new cause of action.
Finally, while the new rule is intended to stop abuse, it is not "a
panacea intended to remedy all manner of attorney misconduct oc-
curring before or during the trial of civil cases." 226 Basing Rule 11
violations on anything other than a specific pleading, motion or
other paper may overstep the limits of the rule. Strict interpretation
of the rule by imposing penalties based only on specific documents
will help to eliminate this danger.
Nancy Burger-Smith
225. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1938) (cited in
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Fernandez, 830 F.2d 952, 956 (8th Cir. 1987)).
226. Adduono v. World Hockey Ass'n, 824 F.2d 617, 621 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing
Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 1986)).
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